Recap the Basics: Port 179

BGP Port 179: The Communication Channel

Port 179 is the well-known port for BGP communication, acting as the gateway for BGP messages to flow between BGP routers. BGP, a complex protocol, requires a reliable and dedicated port to establish connections and exchange routing information. By utilizing port 179, BGP ensures its communication is secure and efficient, enabling routers to establish and maintain BGP sessions effectively.

Establishing BGP Connections

When two BGP routers wish to connect, they initiate a TCP connection on port 179. This connection allows the routers to exchange BGP update messages containing routing information such as network prefixes, path attributes, and policies. Routers build a comprehensive view of the network’s topology by exchanging these updates and making informed decisions on route traffic.

Guide: BGP Port 179

In the following lab guide on port 179, we have two BGP peers labeled BGP Peer 1 and BGP Peer 2. These BGP peers have one Gigabit Ethernet link between them. I have created an iBGP peering between the two peers, where the AS numbering is the same for both peers. 

Note:

Remember that a full mesh iBGP peering is required within an AS because iBGP routers do not re-advertise routes learned via iBGP to other iBGP peers. This is called the split horizon rule and is a routing-loop-prevention mechanism. Since we have two iBGP peers, this is fine. The BGP peerings are over TCP port 179, and I have redistributed connected so we have a route in the BGP table.

BGP Neighbor States

Unlike IGPs such as EIGRP and OSPF, BGP establishes sessions differently. In IGPs, neighbors are dynamically discovered as they bootstrap themselves to the topology. To peer with another BGP speaker, BGP speakers must explicitly be configured to do so. Furthermore, BGP must wait for a reliable connection to be established before proceeding. To overcome some issues with its predecessor, EGP, BGP was enhanced to address this requirement.

For two routers to establish this connection, both sides must have an interface configured for BGP and matching BGP settings, such as an Autonomous System number. Once the two routers have established a BGP neighbor relationship, they exchange routing information and can communicate with each other as needed.

BGP neighbor states represent the different stages of the relationship between BGP routers. These states are crucial in establishing and maintaining connections for exchanging routing information. Idle, Connect, OpenSent, and Established are the four neighbor states. Each state signifies a specific phase in the BGP session establishment process.

1. Idle State:

The first state in the BGP neighborship is the Idle state. In this state, a BGP router does not know any neighboring routers. It is waiting to establish a connection with a potential BGP peer. When a router is in the Idle state, it periodically sends out keepalive messages to potential peers, hoping to initiate the neighborship process.

2. Connect State:

Once a router receives a keepalive message from a potential BGP neighbor, it transitions to the Connect state. The router attempts to establish a TCP connection with the neighboring router in this state. The Connect state lasts until the TCP connection setup is successful, after which the router moves to the OpenSent state.

3. OpenSent State:

In the OpenSent state, the BGP router sends a neighboring router an Open message containing information about its capabilities and parameters. The router waits for a response from the neighbor. If the received Open message is acceptable, the router moves to the OpenConfirm state.

4. OpenConfirm State:

In the OpenConfirm state, BGP routers exchange Keepalive messages to confirm that the TCP connection works correctly. The routers also negotiate various BGP parameters during this state. Once both routers have confirmed the connection, they move to the Established state.

5. Established State:

The Established state is the desired state for BGP neighborship. The routers have successfully established a BGP peering relationship in this state and are actively exchanging routing information. They exchange updates, keepalives, and notifications, enabling them to make informed routing decisions. This state is crucial for the stability and integrity of the overall BGP routing infrastructure.

Below, the BGP state moves from Idle to Active and OpenSent. Some Open messages are sent and received; the BGP routers exchange some of their capabilities. From there, we move to the OpenConfirm and Established state. Finally, you see the BGP neighbor as up. The output of these debug messages is friendly and easy to read. If, for some reason, your neighbor’s adjacency doesn’t appear, these debugs can be helpful to solve the problem.

Port Numbers

Let’s go back to the basics for just a moment. First, we have port numbers, which represent communication endpoints. Port numbers are assigned 16-bit integers (see below) that identify a specific process or network service running on your network. These are not assigned randomly, and IANA is responsible for internet protocol resources, including registering used port numbers for well-known internet services.

• Well Known Ports: 0 through 1023.
• Registered Ports: 1024 through 49151.
• Dynamic/Private: 49152 through 65535.

So, we have TCP port numbers and UDP port numbers. We know TCP enables hosts to establish a connection and exchange data streams reliably. Depending on the application, TCP Port 179 may use a defined protocol to communicate. For example, BGP is an application that uses TCP Port 179.

BGP chose this port for a good reason. TCP guarantees data delivery compared to UDP, and packets will be delivered on port 179 in the same order they were sent. So, we have guaranteed communication on TCP port 179, compared to UDP port 179. UDP port 179 would not have guaranteed communication in the same way as TCP.

UDP vs. TCP

UDP and TCP are internet protocols but have different features and applications. UDP, or User Datagram Protocol, is a lightweight and fast protocol used for applications that do not require reliable data transmission. UDP is a connectionless protocol that does not establish a dedicated end-to-end connection before sending data. Instead, UDP packets are sent directly to the recipient without any acknowledgment or error checking.

Knowledge Check: TCP vs UDP

UDP, often referred to as a “connectionless” protocol, operates at the transport layer of the Internet Protocol Suite. Unlike TCP, UDP does not establish a formal connection between the sender and receiver before transmitting data. Instead, it focuses on quickly sending smaller packets, known as datagrams, without error-checking or retransmission mechanisms. This makes UDP a lightweight and efficient protocol ideal for applications where speed and minimal overhead are crucial.

The Reliability of TCP

In contrast to UDP, TCP is a “connection-oriented” protocol that guarantees reliable data delivery. By employing error-checking, acknowledgment, and flow control, TCP ensures that data is transmitted accurately and in the correct order. This reliability comes at the cost of increased overhead and potential latency, making TCP more suitable for applications that prioritize data integrity and completeness, such as file transfers and web browsing.

Use Cases and Applications

1. UDP:

– Real-time streaming: UDP’s low latency and reduced overhead suit real-time applications like video and audio streaming.

– Online gaming: The fast-paced nature of online gaming benefits from UDP, providing quick updates and responsiveness.

– DNS (Domain Name System): UDP is commonly used for DNS queries, where quick responses are essential for efficient web browsing.

2. TCP:

– Web browsing: TCP’s reliability ensures that web pages and their resources are fully and accurately loaded.

– File transfers: TCP’s error-checking and retransmission mechanisms guarantee the successful delivery of large files.

– Email delivery: TCP’s reliability ensures that emails are transmitted without loss or corruption.

The TCP 3-Way Handshake

TCP, or Transmission Control Protocol, is a more reliable protocol for applications requiring error-free data transmission and guaranteed message delivery. TCP is a connection-oriented protocol that establishes a dedicated end-to-end connection between the sender and receiver before sending data. TCP uses a three-way handshake to establish a connection and provides error checking, retransmission, and flow control mechanisms to ensure data is transmitted reliably and efficiently.

In summary, UDP is a lightweight and fast protocol suitable for applications that do not require reliable data transmissions, such as real-time streaming media and online gaming. TCP is a more reliable protocol ideal for applications requiring error-free data transmissions and guaranteed message delivery, such as web browsing, email, and file transfer.

BGP and TCP Port 179

In the context of BGP, TCP is used to establish a connection between two routers and exchange routing information. When a BGP speaker wants to connect with another BGP speaker, a TCP SYN message is sent to the other speaker. If the other speaker is available and willing to join, it sends a SYN-ACK message. The first speaker then sends an ACK message to complete the connection.

Once the connection is established, the BGP speakers can exchange routing information. BGP uses a set of messages to exchange information about the networks that each speaker can reach. The messages include information about the network prefix, the path to the network, and various attributes that describe the network.

Guide: Filtering TCP Port 179

The following will display the effects of filtering BGP port 179. Below is a simple design of 2 BGP peers—plain and simple. The routers use the directly connected IP addresses for the BGP neighbor adjacency. However, we have a problem: the BGP neighbor relationship is down, and we are not becoming neighbors. What could be wrong? We use the directly connected interfaces so nothing could go wrong except for L2/L2 issues.

Guide: BGP Update Messages

In the following lab guide, you will see we have two BGP peers. There is also a packet capture that displays the BGP update messages. BGP uses source and destination ports other than 179, depending on who originates the session. BGP is a standard TCP-based protocol that runs on client and server computers.

A successful TCP connection must exist before negotiating a BGP session between two peers. TCP provides a reliable transmission medium between the two peers and allows the exchange of BGP-related messages. A broken TCP connection also breaks the BGP session. BGP sessions are not always established after successful TCP connections.

In BGP, the session establishment phase operates independently of TCP, i.e., BGP rides on top of TCP. As a result, two peers may form a TCP connection but disagree on BGP parameters, resulting in a failed peering attempt. The BGP FSM oscillates between IDLE, ACTIVE, and CONNECT states while establishing the TCP connection.

To establish a connection with a TCP server, a TCP client first sends a TCP SYN packet with the destination port as the well-known port. In this first SYN, we are requesting to open a session. The server will reply with a TCP SYN ACK if it permits the session to open. It also wants to open a session. The source port of this SYN-ACK response is a well-known port, and the destination port is randomly chosen. After the three-way handshake, the client responds to the server with a TCP ACK, acknowledging the server’s response.

As far as BGP is concerned, TCP clients and servers are routers. When the “client” router initiates the BGP connection, it sends a request to the server with a destination port 179 and a random X source port. The server then responds with a source port of 179 and a destination port of X. Consequently, all client-to-server traffic uses destination 179, while all server-to-client traffic uses source 179.

The following Wireshark output shows a sample BGP update message. Notice the Dst Port: 179 highlighted in red.

To achieve reliable delivery, developers could either build a new transport protocol or use an existing one. The BGP creators leveraged TCP’s already robust reliability mechanisms instead of reinventing the wheel. This integration with TCP creates two phases of BGP session establishment:

• TCP connection establishment phase
• BGP session establishment phase

BGP uses a finite state machine (FSM) throughout the two phases of session establishment. In computing, a finite state machine is a construct that allows an object – the machine here – to operate within a fixed number of states. There is a specific purpose and set of operations for each state. The machine exists in only one of these states at any given moment. Input events trigger state changes. BGP’s FSM has six states in total. The following three states of BGP’s FSM pertain to TCP connection establishment:

• Idle
• Connect
• Active

TCP messages are exchanged in these states for reliable delivery of BGP messages. After the TCP connection establishment phase, BGP enters the following three states of the BGP FSM, which pertain to the BGP session establishment phase:

• Opensent
• Openconfirm
• Established

In these states, BGP exchanges messages related to the BGP session. The OPENSENT and OPENCONFIRM states correspond to the exchange of BGP session attributes between the BGP speakers. The ESTABLISHED state indicates the peer is stable and can accept BGP routing updates.

Together, these six states make up the entire BGP FSM. BGP maintains a separate FSM for each intended peer. Upon receiving input events, a peer transitions between these states. When a TCP connection is successfully established in the CONNECT or ACTIVE states, the BGP speaker sends an OPEN message and enters the OPENSENT state. An error event could cause the peer to transition to IDLE in any state.

TCP Connection Establishment Phase

Successful TCP connections are required before negotiating a BGP session between two peers. Over TCP, BGP-related messages can be exchanged reliably between two peers. A broken TCP connection also breaks the BGP session. BGP sessions are not permanently established after successful TCP connections.

Because BGP operates independently within a TCP connection, it “rides” on top of TCP. Peering attempts can fail when two peers agree on TCP parameters but disagree on BGP parameters. While establishing the TCP connection, the BGP FSM oscillates between IDLE, ACTIVE, and CONNECT states.

TCP is a connection-oriented protocol. This means TCP establishes a connection between two speakers, ensuring the information is ordered and delivered reliably. To create this connection, TCP uses servers and clients.

• Clients connect to servers, making them the connecting side
• Servers listen for incoming connections from prospective clients

TCP uses port numbers to identify the services and applications a server hosts. HTTP traffic uses TCP port 80, one of the most well-known. Clients initiate connections to these ports to access a specific service from a TCP server. Randomly generated TCP port numbers will be used by TCP clients to source their messages.

Whenever a TCP connection is made, a passive side waits for a connection, and an active side tries to make the connection. The following two methods can be used to open or establish TCP connections:

• Passive Open
• Active Open

A passive open occurs when a TCP server accepts a TCP client’s connection attempts on a specific TCP port. A WebServer, for instance, is configured to accept connections on TCP port 80, also referred to as “listening” on TCP port 80.

Active open occurs when a TCP client attempts to connect to a specific port on a TCP server. In this case, Client A can initiate a connection request to connect to the Web Server’s TCP Port 80.

To establish and manage a TCP connection, clients and servers exchange TCP control messages. Messages sent in TCP/IP packets are characterized by control bits in the TCP header. As shown in the Wireshark capture below, the SYN and ACK bits in the TCP header of the TCP/IP packet play a crucial role in the basic setup of the TCP connection.

Source: PacketPushers

The SYN bit indicates an attempt to establish a connection. To ensure reliable communication, it synchronizes TCP sequence numbers. An ACK bit suggests that a TCP message has been acknowledged. Reliability is based on the requirement that messages be acknowledged.

TCP connections are generally established by exchanging three control messages:

• • The client initiates an active open by sending a TCP/IP packet with the SYN bit set in the TCP header. This is a SYN message.
  • The server responds with its SYN message (the SYN bit is set in the TCP header), resulting in a passive open. The server also acknowledges the client’s SYN segment by indicating the ACK bit in the same control message. Since both SYN and ACK bits are set in the same message, this message is called the SYN-ACK message.
  • The Client responds with a TCP/IP packet, with the ACK bit set in the TCP header, to acknowledge that it received the Server’s SYN segment.

A TCP three-way handshake involves exchanging control messages or segments. Once the handshake is completed, a TCP connection has been established, and data can be exchanged between the devices.

BGP’s three-way handshake is performed as follows:

1. BGP speakers register the BGP process on TCP port 179 and listen for connection attempts from configured clients.
2. As the TCP client, one speaker performs an active open by sending a SYN packet destined to the remote speaker’s TCP port 179. The packet is sourced from a random port number.
3. The remote speaker, acting as a TCP server, performs a passive open by accepting the SYN packet from the TCP client on TCP port 179 and responding with its own SYN-ACK packet.
4. The client speaker responds with an ACK packet, acknowledging it received the server’s SYN packet.

Bonus Content: What Is BGP Hijacking?

A BGP hijack occurs when attackers maliciously reroute Internet traffic. The attacker accomplishes this by falsely announcing ownership of IP prefixes they do not control, own, or route. When a BGP hijack occurs, all the signs on a stretch of the freeway are changed, and traffic is redirected to the wrong exit.

The BGP protocol assumes that interconnected networks are telling the truth about which IP addresses they own, so BGP hijacking is nearly impossible to stop. Imagine if no one watched the freeway signs. The only way to tell if they had been maliciously changed was by observing that many cars ended up in the wrong neighborhoods. To hijack BGP, an attacker must control or compromise a BGP-enabled router that bridges two autonomous systems (AS), so not just anyone can do so.

Inject False Routing Information

BGP hijacking can occur when an attacker gains control over a BGP router and announces false routing information to neighboring routers. This misinformation causes the routers to redirect traffic to the attacker’s network instead of the intended destination. The attacker can then intercept, monitor, or manipulate the traffic for malicious purposes, such as eavesdropping, data theft, or launching distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.

Methods for BGP Hijacking

There are several methods that attackers can use to carry out BGP hijacking. One common technique is prefix hijacking, where the attacker announces a more specific IP address prefix for a given destination than the legitimate owner of that prefix. This causes traffic to be routed through the attacker’s network instead of the legitimate network.

Another method is AS path manipulation, where the attacker modifies the AS path attribute of BGP updates to make their route more appealing to neighboring routers. By doing so, the attacker can attract traffic to their network and then manipulate it as desired.

Mitigate BGP Hijacking

Network operators can implement various security measures to mitigate the risk of BGP hijacking. One crucial step is validating BGP route announcements using Route Origin Validation (ROV) and Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). These mechanisms allow networks to verify the legitimacy of BGP updates and reject any malicious or unauthorized announcements.

Additionally, network operators should establish BGP peering relationships with trusted entities and implement secure access controls for their routers. Regular monitoring and analysis of BGP routing tables can also help detect and mitigate hijacking attempts in real-time.

BGP Exploit and Port 179

Exploiting Port 179

Port 179 is the designated port for BGP communication. Cybercriminals can exploit this port to manipulate BGP routing tables, redirecting traffic to unauthorized destinations. Attackers can potentially intercept and use sensitive data by impersonating a trusted BGP peer or injecting false routing information.

The consequences of a successful BGP exploit can be severe. Unauthorized rerouting of internet traffic can lead to data breaches, service disruptions, and even financial losses. The exploit can be particularly damaging for organizations that rely heavily on network connectivity, such as financial institutions and government agencies.

Protecting your network from BGP exploits requires a multi-layered approach. Here are some essential measures to consider:

1. Implement BGP Security Best Practices: Ensure your BGP routers are correctly configured and follow best practices, such as filtering and validating BGP updates.

2. BGP Monitoring and Alerting: Deploy robust monitoring tools to detect anomalies and suspicious activities in BGP routing. Real-time alerts can help you respond swiftly to potential threats.

3. Peer Authentication and Route Validation: Establish secure peering relationships and implement mechanisms to authenticate BGP peers. Additionally, consider implementing Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the legitimacy of BGP routes.

BGP Port 179 Exploit

What is the BGP protocol in networking? The operation of the Internet Edge and BGP is crucial to ensure that Internet services are available. Unfortunately, this zone is a public-facing infrastructure exposed to various threats, such as denial-of-service, spyware, network intrusion, web-based phishing, and application-layer attacks. BGP is highly vulnerable to multiple security breaches due to the lack of a scalable means of verifying the authenticity and authorization of BGP control traffic.

As a result, a bad actor could compromise BGP and inject believable BGP messages into the communication between BGP peers. As a result, they were injecting bogus routing information or breaking the peer-to-peer connection.

In addition, outsider sources can also disrupt communications between BGP peers by breaking their TCP connection with spoofed RST packets. To do this, you need to undergo BGP vulnerability testing. One option is to use the port 179 BGP exploit to collect data on the security posture of BGP implementations.

Metasploit: A Powerful Penetration Testing Tool:

Metasploit, developed by Rapid7, is an open-source penetration testing framework that provides a comprehensive set of tools for testing and exploiting vulnerabilities. One of its modules focuses specifically on BGP port 179, enabling ethical hackers and security professionals to assess the security posture of their networks.

Exploiting BGP with Metasploit:

Metasploit offers a wide range of BGP-related modules that can be leveraged to simulate attacks and identify potential vulnerabilities. These modules enable users to perform tasks such as BGP session hijacking, route injection, route manipulation, and more. By utilizing Metasploit’s BGP modules, network administrators can proactively identify weaknesses in their network infrastructure and implement appropriate mitigation strategies.

Benefits of Metasploit BGP Module:

The utilization of Metasploit’s BGP module brings several benefits to network penetration testing:

1. Comprehensive Testing: Metasploit’s BGP module allows for thorough testing of BGP implementations, helping organizations identify and address potential security flaws.
2. Real-World Simulation: By simulating real-world attacks, Metasploit enables security professionals to gain deeper insights into the impact of BGP vulnerabilities on their network infrastructure.
3. Enhanced Risk Mitigation: Using Metasploit to identify and understand BGP vulnerabilities helps organizations develop effective risk mitigation strategies, ensuring the integrity and availability of their networks.

Border Gateway Protocol Design

Service Provider ( SP ) Edge Block

Service Provider ( SP ) Edge comprises Internet-facing border routers. These routers are the first line of defense and will run external Border Gateway Protocol ( eBGP ) to the Internet through dual Internet Service Providers ( ISP ).

Border Gateway Protocol is a policy-based routing protocol deployed at the edges of networks connecting to 3rd-party networks and has redundancy and highly available methods such as BGP Multipath. However, as it faces the outside world, it must be secured and hardened to overcome numerous blind and semi-blind attacks it can face, such as DoS or Man-in-the-Middle Attacks.

 Man-in-the-middle attacks

Possible attacks against BGP could be BGP route injection from a bidirectional man-in-the-middle attack. In theory, BGP route injection seems simple if one compares it to a standard ARP spoofing man-in-the-middle attack, but in practice, it does not. To successfully insert a “neighbor between neighbors,” a rogue router must successfully TCP hijack BGP.

 Requires the following:

1. Correctly matching the source address and source port.
2. Matching the destination port.
3. Guess the TTL if a BGP TTL hacks if applied.
4. Match the TCP sequence numbers.
5. Bypassing MD5 authentication ( if any ).

 Although this might seem like a long list, it is possible. The first step would be to ARP Spoof the connection between BGP peers using Dsniff or Ettercap. After successfully spoofing the session, launch tools from CIAG BGP, such as TCP hijack. The payload is a BGP Update or a BGP Notification packet fed into the targeted session.

 Blind DoS attacks against BGP routers

A DoS attack on a BGP peer would devastate the overall network, more noticeably for exit traffic, as BGP deployment occurs at the network’s edges. On the other hand, a DoS attack could bring down a BGP peer and cause route flapping or dampening. A widespread DoS attack floods the target BGP service, enabling MD5 authentication using SYN TCP packets with MD5 signatures. The attack overloads the targeted peer with loads of MD5 authentication processing, which consumes all its resources that should process standard control and data plane function packets.

Countermeasures – Protecting the Edge.

One way to lock down BGP is to implement the “BGP TTL hack,” known as the BGP TTL security check. This feature protects eBGP sessions ( not iBGP ) and compares the value in the received IP packet’s Time-to-Live ( TTL ) field with a hop count locally configured on each eBGP neighbor. All packets with values less than the expected value are silently discarded.

One security concern with BGP is the possibility of a malicious attacker injecting false routing information into the network. To mitigate this risk, a TTL (Time to Live) security check can be implemented.

TTL Security Check

The TTL security check involves verifying the TTL value of a BGP update message. The TTL value is a field in the IP header specifying the maximum number of hops a packet can travel before being discarded. When a BGP update message is received, the TTL value is checked to ensure that the message has traveled fewer hops than expected. If the TTL value is higher than expected, the message is discarded.

Implementing a TTL security check can help prevent attacks such as route hijacking and route leaks. Route hijacking is an attack where a malicious actor announces false routing information to redirect traffic to a different destination. Route leaks occur when a network announces routes that it does not control, leading to potential traffic congestion and instability.

Importance of BGP TTL Security Check:

1. Mitigating Route Leaks: Route leaks occur when BGP routers inadvertently advertise routes to unauthorized peers. By implementing TTL security checks, routers can verify the authenticity of received BGP packets, preventing unauthorized route advertisements and mitigating the risk of route leaks.

2. Preventing IP Spoofing: TTL security check is crucial in preventing IP spoofing attacks. By verifying the TTL value of incoming BGP packets, routers can ensure that the source IP address is legitimate and not spoofed. This helps maintain the trustworthiness of routing information and prevents potential network attacks.

3. Enhancing BGP Routing Security: BGP TTL security check adds an extra layer of security to BGP routing. By validating the TTL values of incoming packets, network operators can detect and discard packets with invalid TTL values, thus preventing potential attacks that manipulate TTL values.

Implementation of BGP TTL Security Check:

To implement BGP TTL security checks, network operators can configure BGP routers to verify the TTL values of received BGP packets. This can be done by setting a minimum TTL threshold, which determines the minimum acceptable TTL value for incoming BGP packets. Routers can then drop packets with TTL values below the configured threshold, ensuring that only valid packets are processed.

It is possible to forge the TTL field in the IP packet header. To forge accurately, the TTL count of matching the TTL count of the configured neighbor is nearly impossible. The trusted peer would most likely be compromised for this to take place. After you enable the check, the configured BGP peers send all their updates with a TTL of 255. This router only accepts BGP packets with a TTL value of 252 or more significant in the command syntax below.

Routers learned from SP 1 should not be leaked to SP 2 and vice versa. The following should be matched and applied to an outbound route map.

BGP is one of the protocols that makes the Internet work. Most hackers and attackers worldwide target BGP due to its criticality and importance to the Internet. Attackers are primarily interested in finding vulnerabilities in systems like BGP and exploiting them. If they are successful, they can cause significant disruption to the Internet by finding a loophole in BGP. This is the primary reason for securing a BGP.

Before securing BGP, there are a few primary areas to focus on:

• Authentication: BGP neighbors in the same AS or two different ASs must be authenticated. BGP sessions and routing information should be shared only with authenticated BGP neighbors.
• Message integrity: BGP messages should not be illegally modified during transport.
• Availability: BGP speakers should be protected from Denial-of-Service (DoS) or Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks.
• Prefix origination validation: Implementing a mechanism to distinguish between invalid and legitimate routes for BGP destinations is necessary.
• AS path verification: Verify that no illegal entity falsifies an AS_PATH (modifies it with a wrong AS number or deletes it). This can result in traffic black holes for the destination prefix as the route selection process uses AS_PATH.

A Final Note on BGP Security

BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) is a protocol used to exchange routing information between different Autonomous Systems (AS) on the Internet. The Internet must function correctly, but it introduces various security challenges.

BGP Hijacking

One of the most significant security challenges with BGP is the possibility of BGP hijacking. BGP hijacking occurs when an attacker announces illegitimate routes to a BGP speaker, causing traffic to be diverted to the attacker’s network. This can lead to severe consequences, such as loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected network.

Various security mechanisms have been proposed to prevent BGP hijacking. One of the most commonly used mechanisms is the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). RPKI is a system that enables network operators to verify the legitimacy of BGP advertisements. RPKI associates a public key with a route object in the BGP routing table. If the public key associated with a route object matches the public key of the originating AS, the route is considered legitimate.

BGPsec

Another mechanism to prevent BGP hijacking is the use of BGPsec. BGPsec is a security extension to BGP that provides cryptographic protection to BGP messages. BGPsec ensures that BGP messages are not tampered with during transit and that the origin of the BGP messages can be verified.

In addition to BGP hijacking, BGP is also susceptible to other security threats, such as BGP route leaks and BGP route flaps. Various best practices should be followed to mitigate these threats, such as implementing route filtering, route reflectors, and deploying multiple BGP sessions.

In conclusion, BGP is a critical Internet protocol that introduces various security challenges. To ensure the security and stability of the Internet, network operators must implement appropriate security mechanisms and best practices to prevent BGP hijacking, route leaks, and other security threats.

A Final Note on BGP Port 179

BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) is a crucial component of the internet infrastructure, facilitating the exchange of routing information between different networks. One of the most critical aspects of BGP is its use of well-known port numbers to establish connections and exchange data. Port 179 holds a significant role among these port numbers.

Port 179 is designated explicitly for BGP communication. It serves as the default port for establishing TCP connections between BGP routers. BGP routers utilize this port to exchange routing information and ensure the optimal flow of network traffic.

BGP Sessions

Port 179’s importance in BGP cannot be overstated. It acts as the gateway for BGP sessions to establish connections between routers. BGP routers use this port to communicate and share information about available routes, network prefixes, and other relevant data. This allows routers to make informed decisions about the most efficient path-forwarding traffic.

When a BGP router initiates a connection, it sends a TCP SYN packet to the destination router on port 179. If the destination router is configured to accept BGP connections, it responds with a SYN-ACK packet, establishing a TCP connection. Once the connection is established, BGP routers exchange updates and inform each other about network changes.

Port 179 is typically used for external BGP (eBGP) sessions, where BGP routers from different autonomous systems connect to exchange routing information. However, it can also be used for internal BGP (iBGP) sessions within the same autonomous system.

Port 179 is a well-known port.

It is worth noting that port 179 is a well-known port, meaning it is standardized and widely recognized across networking devices and software. This standardization ensures compatibility and allows BGP routers from different vendors to communicate seamlessly.

While port 179 is the default port for BGP, it is essential to remember that BGP can be configured to use other port numbers if necessary. This flexibility allows network administrators to adapt BGP to their specific requirements, although it is generally recommended to stick with the default port for consistency and ease of configuration.

In conclusion, port 179 enables BGP routers to establish connections and exchange routing information. It is the gateway for BGP sessions, ensuring efficient network traffic flow. Understanding the significance of port 179 is essential for network administrators working with BGP and plays a vital role in maintaining a robust and efficient internet infrastructure.

Note: BGP operation is unaffected by the client/server model except for those who connect to port 179 and those who source from port 179. The client or server can be on either side of the BGP session. In some designs, however, assigning TCP server and client roles to specific devices might be desirable. Such a client/server interaction with BGP can be found in hub-spoke topologies such as DMVPN – DMVPN phases,  where the hub is configured as a route-reflector and the spokes are configured as route-reflector clients. BGP dynamic neighbors can be used to ensure that the hub listens and accepts connections from various potential IP addresses, so it becomes a TCP server waiting passively for the spokes to open TCP connections.